From his blog:

The Clippers are in turmoil and have announced they “want to win now.” Is this possible? Since trading away Marcus Camby the Clippers have played around 8 points worse than an average NBA team. Surprisingly, most of the poor play has occurred when Steve Blake is in. Blake had played great for Portland this year, but if you look at all minutes since the Camby trade the Clippers performance breaks down as follows:

• Blake or Novak in (mostly Blake) the Clippers in 342 minutes have played 14 points worse than average.
• Rest of time the Clippers have played 2 points better than average,

It may be that Blake is having trouble learning the offense, I do not know, but he has clearly been hurting the Clippers. Some other amazing stats:

• In the 94 minutes Outlaw and Baron are in together, the Clippers play 11 points better than average.
• Butler, Baron Davis, Gordon, Kaman and Gooden have been solid, playing 4 points better than average in 128 minutes.
• Butler, Davis, Gordon, Kaman and Smith have been great: In 53 min this lineup plays 18 points better than average.
• In 55 min with Outlaw and Gooden in and Kaman out the Clippers play 11 points better than average.

Building around the things that work should enable the Clippers to win some games. Perhaps then LeBron can be convinced that a nucleus of Kaman, Gordon, Outlaw, and Baron and a coach of his choosing is where he wants to land in 2010.

Winston fails to mention Blake Griffin, who should only add to the Clippers’ future.

ADDENDUM
Haralabos Voulgaris e-mails:
There is really nothing meaningful Adjusted numbers can determine from such small samples, his biggest minute sample is 128 minutes and you really can’t do anything to predict future success on a sample that small, in fact even using a whole season’s worth of your most-used lineup. For instance, in 2009 Boston’s most-used lineup played 4267 possessions (their starters). If you tried using one year of lineup data to predict future outcomes you would have faired much worse than using two full seasons’ worth of lineup data. I’d have a hard time stating with any level of authority any findings better than or worse than average using one full season of data, without a very sophisticated modeling technique. I can’t imagine using the clearest of crystal balls could draw any conclusions using 100 minutes of data.

I spent the weekend at the MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference in Boston. Last year, the same conference was held in a small academic building on the campus of MIT in Cambridge for 400 attendees. This year, the numbers exploded — one thousand individuals wore name tags, along with 400 people on a wait list. Those in Boston included NBA executives and prominent agents. Organizers moved the conference across the Charles River to the Boston Convention Center in order to accommodate the demand.

The substance of the conference was pretty much what you’d expect. Houston Rockets general manager Daryl Morey (the founder of the conference), Analytics godfather Dean Oliver (who works for the Nuggets), Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban, Portland Trail Blazers general manager Kevin Pritchard, Boston Celtics assistant general manager Mike Zarren and others who apply advanced statistical analytics to better their teams spoke on various panels about the value of this discipline in generating wins. Academics presented papers on everything from the value of a blocked shot to how best to maximize shot distribution among a team’s players.

All in all, 16 of the 30 NBA organizations were represented at the conference by executives or statisticians — that’s about double the number of teams who had paid attendees in 2009. It was heartening to run into smart young thinkers in this area who were free agents last year, but have been hired in the past 12 months by teams. Kevin Pelton, who has worked tirelessly in this field, just signed on with the Indiana Pacers. Ryan Parker, of Basketball Geek, has joined the Portland Trail Blazers. Jon Nichols, a brilliant grad student at Harvard in information technology, has been hired by an undisclosed team. For all the findings and discussions, the most profound takeaway from the conference was the overwhelming evidence that the application of advanced analytics is taking over the NBA. What was once a novelty has become a full-fledged movement. Not every team has embraced these tools, but as Dean Oliver pointed out, the smart ones have. Boston, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Houston, Memphis, Oklahoma City, Orlando, Portland, San Antonio have probably been the 10 most aggressive organizations. What do they have in common? Every one of these teams has a record of .500 or better this morning. If I’m a fan of a specific team, I want my team to be on that list and, unless my squad is winning titles on the strength of its personnel decisions (and checkbook), I’d be bothered if they weren’t.

Some teams executives will tell you that the League has gotten smart about furnishing teams with more extensive data (stats like deflections), and that the need to have experts on the payroll isn’t necessary. But there’s a vast difference between data and informed conclusions. The former are easy to come by; the latter requires great expertise. As Zarren said in the session on basketball analytics, “You can do two things: get more data, or use statistical techniques with the data that you have.” As we move forward in the empirical age, it strikes me that if you don’t have the proper personnel who can understand and utilize these techniques, your organization is going to be left behind.

The Clippers aren’t ignorant of advanced metrics. Mike Dunleavy made the wise decision to shift Rasual Butler into the starting lineup in part because basic plus-minus data were telling him that was the smart thing to do. Back in October, team executives said they targeted Craig Smith in the off-season because they loved his efficiency numbers. But these observations barely penetrate the surface of the shale. There is so much to be understood, a fact more and more teams are beginning to grasp.

Teams are very proprietary of what they’re learning and even whom they’re hiring to crunch these numbers. For all we know, the Clippers have an army of credentialed statisticians studying data, making unique discoveries about the team and passing along those findings to the decision makers in Playa Vista. If that’s not the case, Clippers fans should hope it soon becomes a reality. In an age where information is king, NBA teams, global corporations, governments and individuals can’t afford to be playing catch-up.

Wyn Douglas is the master of oblong modules featuring many of your favorite Clippers. His flow chart will give you an idea of how the current Clippers roster was built:

Top five units in basketball in overall rating (offensive points per 100 possessions-defensive points per 100 possessions, minimum 100 minutes played):

1. Dallas Mavericks (41.42)
Jason Kidd
Jason Terry
Shawn Marion
Dirk Nowitzki
Erick Dampier

2. Atlanta Hawks (36.66)
Mike Bibby
Jamal Crawford
Joe Johnson
Josh Smith
Al Horford

3. Los Angeles Lakers (24.22)
Derek Fisher
Kobe Bryant
Ron Artest
Pau Gasol
Andrew Bynum

4. Orlando Magic (20.28)
Jason Williams
Vince Carter
Mickael Pietrus
Rashard Lewis
Dwight Howard

5. Los Angeles Clippers (20.00)
Baron Davis
Eric Gordon
Rasual Butler
Marcus Camby
Chris Kaman

If you go with Adjusted +/- (account for both the teammates and the opponents on the floor), that Clippers unit jumps to #4 ahead of the Lakers unit.

The indispensable 82games.com has launched its 2009-10 coverage, and the advanced numbers for the Clippers are both fascinating and encouraging.

Improved Ball Movement
For the first time in a long while, the Clippers are truly able to space the floor effectively. As a result, the ball has been flowing freely from post to perimeter and from sideline to sideline.

As of Sunday, the Clippers rank second in the league in assist rate, and 65 percent of their field goals have been assisted. Last season, only 58 percent of the Clippers’ made shots were assisted. The Clips are “out-assisting” the opposition at every position except for small forward.

Eric Gordon, Dominant
When you examine Eric’s numbers closely, it begins to dawn on you: He rarely takes a bad shot.

If the pass hits him low or not in stride, he’ll survey the floor for the next best thing. If the defender is up in his face, Eric will gladly put the ball on the deck and drive. If the shot is contested, he’ll keep the ball moving — and he rarely takes an ill-advised heave off the dribble.

An eye-popping 88 percent of EJ’s jump shots are assisted, and his true shooting percentage mark is 63.5 percent.

How valuable has he been to the Clippers to start the season? The team scores 108.8 points per 100 possessions and allows only 100.9 when Eric is on the floor. When Eric’s on the bench, the Clippers are a basket case (94.0/125.4).

Baron Davis, More Restrained
As a jump shooter, Baron isn’t any better this season than he was last season (his eFG is actually a bit worse on jumpers). One thing has changed, though — jump shots represent fewer of Baron’s overall attempts, and it’s paying off.

In 2008-09, 70 percent of Baron’s attempts were jumpers, while only 30 percent were “close shots.” This season, that ratio is down to 59/41.

Think of Baron and his jumper/close shot distribution like the national Democratic Party and evangelical voters (or the Republican Party and Latino voters, if you prefer): “Close shots” don’t need to compose a majority of Baron’s attempts for him to be effective, but Baron needs to keep that gap narrow.

He’s being more selective, one of the reasons for his 52.8 percent true shooting percentage — well above his career average.

Baron’s conditioning can be seen in his shooting percentage on those inside shots. Last season, Baron converted only 48.6 percent of his close shots. This season, he’s finishing at a much better 58.1 percent clip. Baron is also rebounding the ball better and dishing out more dimes — two more reasons his PER is at an impressive 18.62.

Chris Kaman, Almost Too Good not to be an Outlier
I can’t stop looking at Kaman’s early stats. They’re irresistible.

Chris’ Estimated Wins Average (a stat that approximates how many wins a player is worth to his team) is second only to Dwight Howard among centers. His eFG on jump shots is 50 percent, his turnover rate has plummeted, and the Clippers are a markedly better defensive team when Chris is on the floor.

Aside from his offensive rebounding rate, it’s hard to find an area where Chris isn’t exceeding his career numbers — and the explanation for his drop in ORR is pretty logical: Guys who are killing you 17 feet from the basket as their team’s primary scoring option aren’t likely to scoop up a lot of misses off the front of the rim.

Is it fair to expect Chris to keep this pace up? Probably not. But even if Kaman’s true shooting percentage dips into the upper-50s from its current rate of 62.3 percent, the Clips will benefit from his efficiency, so long as the defense is there.

Lineups & Rotations
Though they’ve played lesser competition, the starting lineup of Davis-Gordon-Butler-Camby-Kaman is unstoppable. In the 99 minutes of basketball they’ve played as a unit, they’re a +39. In effective field goal percentage, the gap is .503 for the Fabulous Five and .405 for the opposition. This unit has also attempted 47 more free throws than the opponents during those 99 minutes. The only thing they don’t do well is rebound the ball.

When Thornton starts at the 3, the Clips are doing pretty well, too — a +13 in 76 minutes.

What does this tell you about the Clippers?

For one, Sebastian Telfair hasn’t been effective. In his 126 minutes on the floor, the Clips are a -30.

But wait a minute! Isn’t Bassy shooting the ball better than ever, with a true shooting percentage over 50 percent for the first time in his pro career? Well, yes. The Clippers are shooting the ball just as well when Telfair is at the point.

It’s Telfair’s defense that’s killing the Clippers’ reserve unit.

How bad is it? The Clippers give up a whopping 13 points more per 100 possessions when Telfair is on the floor (and more times than not, he’s guarding the ball). On top of that, the team takes a big rebounding hit with Telfair, turns the ball over more and gets to the line less frequently.

Cautious Optimism
Mike Dunleavy has been giving substantial minutes to eight players. Advanced stats show that four of them (Gordon, Kaman, Camby, Baron Davis) have been very efficient to stratospherically insane. Two of them have been quite useful, if limited (Smith, Butler). And, for whatever reason, the Clippers are likely to be outplayed when two of them (Thornton, Telfair) are on the floor.

What can we take away from all this? First and foremost, the health of the four principals is vital to the Clippers’ success. A prolonged absence by any one of them — particualrly the two starting guards — would devastate the team.

Beyond that, we’re seeing that a semi-controlled post-and-kick attack is where the Clippers are most effective. Break opportunities will surface as the Clippers tighten their defense (which we’ve witnessed over the past week) and as they improve on the glass (work in progress), but if they can continue to run the offense through the post and force opponents into making tough choices (double Kaman off Gordon? Yikes), there’s a blueprint here for success.

If you speak to executives who use advanced analytics to make player personnel decisions, many of them will tell you a similar story about such stats:

We like to look at the performance of specific units as much as individual players.

Since opening night, the Clippers have fielded five units that have played collectively greater than 9 minutes:

Notice something? The top four units — the lineups that have logged double-digit minutes — have each outperformed [ed: or played even with] the competition.  The starting lineup with Butler at the small forward has been particularly efficient offensively and has been beastly on the boards.

Collectively, both starting lineups have logged a +28 on the season!

So why have the Clippers dropped four of their first five games?

The more marginal lineups have killed them.

• The unit of Telfair-Gordon-Butler-Smith-Jordan have spent only six minutes on the floor together, but compiled a -8.
• Davis-Butler-Thornton-Camby-Kaman have played together for only four minutes, but went -7.
• Baron Davis-Ricky Davis-Butler-Thornton-Kaman? -6 in only four minutes.

What can we take away from all this?  For one, it’s early. The standard error on numbers like these 240 minutes into a season is enormous. But to the extent these stats tell us something, it might be that the Clips will operate best with a consistent rotation.