Before you abandon ship after the Spurs’ 115-90 thumping of the Clippers, please remember that I (as well as other writers) cautioned this type of game(s) would occur early on in the season. But don’t panic — the Spurs are a good team (if it weren’t for their awesome shooting night, this game would have likely resembled the Spurs victory over the Grizzlies) and the Clippers are still developing. If it makes you feel any better, the Warriors just beat the Bulls and the Knicks, proving that they’re no scrub team.

The truth is there’s not much to take away from two games. Neither Clipper performance was admirable — in reality, they could be 0-2 if Chris Paul hadn’t gone off on his fourth quarter tear on Christmas Day. However, he did, and he saved the Clippers from a code-red panic. Looking at the numbers after a couple of games (yes, I know it’s a small sample size but there a few perturbing trends here), here are a couple of areas that need improvement for the Clippers.

Chris Paul pick-and-rolls

According to Synergy Sports, as the ball-handler in 20 pick-and-roll situations, Paul has called his own number 12 times (60 percent). In those 12 scenarios, he’s two-for-three on jumpers, one-for-two on layups, missed the only floater he took, has two turnovers (one offensive foul and one travel) and has drawn four fouls (three shooting, one non-shooting). While he hasn’t been as aggressive as most would hope, Paul is a bulldog in the pick-and-roll. If he decides to try and score, it’s almost a guarantee he’s attacking the basket, unless the opportunity for an open jumper presents itself.

When he’s decided to pass to the roll man (who in many cases has popped out instead of attacking the basket), it has resulted in three-for-five shooting on jumpers (one made 3-pointer), one-for-two shooting on lay-ups (one missed alley-oop lay-up to D.J.) and one drawn foul. There’s no “Lob City” because Paul isn’t throwing lobs. He’s mainly kicking it out for jumpers as teams pack the paint and try and avoid the embarrassment of making SportsCenter.

What do these numbers mean? That positive outcomes (either scored baskets or fouls drawn) have occurred in 12 of the 20 pick-and-rolls that Paul has been involved in (60 percent). Despite the small sample size, that’s an astounding number. If you count missed lay-ups has high-percentage opportunities, the number jumps up to 15 out of 20 (75 percent). That’s an absurdly high rate for scoring opportunities.

The problem is that the Clippers have only run 40 pick-and-rolls (19.3 percent of their total plays). As Nick Flynt points out, Paul’s perceived passivity is somewhat of a folly. He’s making good decisions in the pick-and-roll, it’s just not being run that often. Moving froward, the team will need to address this befuddling conundrum: Why aren’t they running more pick-and-rolls for Paul (with Griffin as the screener)?

The four factors

According to HoopData, winning at least three of the four factors (effective field goal percentage, turnover rate, offensive rebound rate, free throw rate) is usually a good sign as to which team is going to win a basketball game. Against the Warriors, the Clippers won effective Field Goal percentage (+8.5 percent), Turnover rate (-6.4) and Free Throw rate (+17.6). The only factor they lost was Offensive Rebound rate (-6.7).

Against the Spurs, however, the Clippers were mauled in eFG% (-18.6 percent — the Spurs had a ridiculous 62.5 eFG%) and lost offensive rebound rate again (-4.2). But for the second straight game, they took care of the ball better (-5.4 TOr) and got to the line more (25.8 FTr).

Those are two great signs. The additions of Paul and Billups has increased the Clippers trips to the foul line (both draw a lot of fouls and create opportunities for teammates) and limited their turnovers (which is key to running an efficient offense and limiting opponents’ transition opportunities). They had one average shooting game (GSW) and one horrid shooting game (SAS).

The only bad sign so far from the Clippers, that doesn’t appear to be a fluke, is their lack of rebounding. Including the two preseason games, they’ve been out-rebounded by a total of 42 boards (10.5 per game). The second Lakers game, where they got embarrassed by being out-boarded by 17, is an outlier. But it hasn’t really been close — the Clippers as constructed are going to struggle on the boards. Reggie Evans will help, it’s just a question of how much.

The solution?

Determining the Clippers’ season-long fate after two games isn’t logical. We can’t deem the Clippers championship contenders after their win in Oakland, and we can’t say they’re underachieving because of the bashing they took in Texas. Wins and losses don’t matter right now — how the games are being played does, however.

At this point in time, all we can do is analyze their performance and look for ways they can improve. Step No. 1? Run more Chris Paul pick-and-rolls. They’re effective. Step No. 2? Box out and grab a few more rebounds. Playing Evans (once he’s healthy) and signing Joel Przybilla are two ways to lessen the rebounding gap.

There, that was easy.

Follow @JovanBuha

By Brian Chan
Special to ClipperBlog

Between the inexperienced rookies and the stubborn veterans on the Clippers roster, Eric Gordon stands out as a special talent. Selected 7th overall in the 2008 NBA Draft, Gordon has the ability to give the Clippers what they have so desperately needed — Eric Gordon can be “the guy.” After gaining valuable experience as a key player on Team USA this Summer in the World Championships, Gordon is primed to have a breakout year. The early season injuries have forced Gordon to see some time at the point guard position, but what exactly does he need to do to become an “elite” player?

One way we can judge player value is through John Hollinger’s PER rating. League average PER is 15 and Eric Gordon’s PER for the 2009-10 season was 14.1. The PER for some of the top guards for the 2009-2010 season, as well as Hollinger’s general guide for PER, can be found below.

According to the numbers, in order to become an elite player, Gordon would need to raise his PER to around the low to mid 20s range. John Hollinger explains Gordon’s low PER by the fact that, outside of scoring, Gordon has an “exceptionally limited impact on the rest of the box score.” By looking at the various inputs for PER and statistics from the 2009-10 season, we can see what Gordon has to do to become one of the top guards.

Offense
Gordon is first and foremost a scorer; however, limited touches prevented him from averaging higher than 16.9 points per 36 minutes. It is difficult to predict how his offensive game will evolve; but, the below charts illustrate the effect on his PER if he: takes more field goals, increases his shooting percentage, increases his 3-point percentage, and increases his free throw percentage.

Increasing his shooting percentages appears to have the greatest effect on PER. It is feasible that the presence of Griffin will allow Gordon to get better looks and, accordingly, increase his accuracy. For the team’s sake, it is important that Gordon increases his usage rate as well. One of the other facets of usage rate is assists.

Early this season, Gordon has shown his ability to create for others. Although his career assist figures are pedestrian, things may change as his role becomes more defined. The following chart shows assists to PER.

Another area of Gordon’s game that leaves something to be desired is turnovers. Gordon’s career turnover ratio is 11.2 — that’s the percentage of Gordon’s possessions that end in a turnover.

Defense
Although defense is one of the most difficult things in basketball to quantify, the consensus is that Gordon is a pretty good perimeter defender. Despite his relative lack of size for the shooting guard position, Gordon’s strength and quickness allow him to disrupt perimeter players. The below chart illustrates how his PER will change based on steals production.

One of the knocks on Eric Gordon is his incapacity to rebound. The 2009-10 PER leaders at the shooting guard position averaged 4.64 rebounds per 36 minutes, but Gordon averaged only 2.6. According to Hollinger, his rebounding rate was the 3rd lowest at the shooting guard position and the 10th worst in all of basketball. The rebound-to-PER schedule is below.

Gordon’s lack of size makes it difficult for him to contest shots, but just for fun … blocks.

This Season
Eric Gordon has emerged as the team’s de facto leader. It can be seen in his mannerisms and his fire, and it has led to an increase in his aggressiveness and assertiveness on the both ends of the floor. His usage rate has increased from 21.5 percent to 29.6 percent, while also shooting a higher percentage. Despite shooting only .203 from 3-point range, his field goal percentage has increased from .449 to .453, in part due to his dedication to driving to the rim.

According to HoopData, Eric Gordon has increased his attempts at the rim from 5.0 to 5.8 attempts per 40 minutes, while hitting 70.4 percent of them, and he has increased his attempts from less than 10 feet from 0.8 to 2.8. Even more impressively, his free throw attempts per 36 minutes has increased from 4.8 to 8.8. Gordon’s penetration and increased ballhandling has allowed him to create for his teammates as well, as seen in his 4.7 assists per 36 minutes (3.0 last season).

On top of his offensive production, Gordon has also increased his rebounds by more than one per 36 minutes; however, there is still room for improvement. All of Gordon’s gains have combined for a strong PER of 20.45, and will likely increase as his 3-point touch returns and his rebounding effort continues. The development of Eric Gordon has been one of the bright spots for the Clipper season and is one of the reasons for hope for the Clipper franchise. When the Clippers veterans return from injury, they will be greeted with a different team.

They will be greeted with Eric Gordon’s team.

Brian Chan is a Southern California transplant and life-long Clippers fan living in the Bay Area.  The things keeping him content are his camera, the game of basketball and the beauty of Chris Kaman. Today, he digs inside the data for ClipperBlog to establish a benchmark for the 2010-11 season. It’s a tall task because the Clippers have overhauled their roster from a season ago. With all those moving parts to account for, here are Chan’s conclusions:

Clipper Win Projections Using WARP
With the start of the season upon us, there are many questions in the minds of Clippers fans.  Will Blake Griffin live up to the hype? Will Eric Gordon develop into an elite 2-guard?  Can the Clippers stay healthy?  All of these questions boil down to one overarching question: how many games will the Clippers win this season?

There have been many projections for the NBA Season, most of which seem to paint a fairly grim picture for the Clippers.  I thought I would try my hand at a simple projection that would give reasonable results and could show the drivers of a team’s wins or the lack thereof.  For this projection, I used Kevin Pelton’s insightful Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP) System, to try to see if a team’s cumulative WARP is representative of its eventual total wins.

WARP attempts to evaluate a player based on how many wins the player would produce on a team with four average players relative to the wins produced by a team consisting of four average players and one replacement level player, where replacement level is defined as the level of production of a readily available replacement (not starters). The WARP evaluation is based on various statistics that rate a player’s offensive and defensive production and efficiency, and it allows the rating of players on a per minute basis.   The WARP Formula breaks down as:

WARP = (Win% – RL) * (Min/48)

WARP: Wins Above Replacement Player

Win% = Winning Percentage of Team (Player X + 4 Average Players)

RL = Winning Percentage of Replacement Level Team (Estimated: 10 wins/82 games)

Min. = Minutes

There are many detailed formulas that go into WARP; however, by using WARP and Minute numbers from Basketball Prospectus, we can identify a “Win%”, which can in turn be used to recalculate WARP based on projected minutes in 2011.

This win projection assumes that teams are about as good as the sum of their parts.  After finding the 2010 WARP for each player who played on a team and adjusting for minutes for players who were moved mid-season, we have a roster broken down by WARP.  By adding the WARP for the roster, you have a cumulative WARP that represents contributions by all players during the season.  Comparing cumulative WARP to team wins produces interesting results:

As seen in the table, there is a strong correlation (0.92) between cumulative WARP and season wins.  There are a few inconsistencies, such as the Lakers with a 37.2 WARP, but in general, the trend appears to be that a higher team cumulative WARP results in a higher number of team wins.

Applying a simple regression will allow us to approximately predict wins in the 2011 season based on projected 2011 WARP.

Using the previous season’s WARP Win % and basic estimations of players’ minutes based on their spot on the depth chart, our projected 2011 WARP looks like the following:

This method allows for simple projected WARP for players with historical figures; however, it doesn’t account for the rookies who will be seeing playing time.  Instead of attempting to estimate their WARPs, one can look at the possible scenarios.

Scenario 1: In this situation, there is no player progression and the rookies all play at a replacement player level.  The expected WARP would be 11.12 and the expected win total becomes 18.33.  This drop in wins reflects the loss of Marcus Camby, the Clipper with the highest WARP in 2010 despite not being on the team for the entire season.

Scenario 2: In Scenario 2, we assume Blake Griffin at least replaces Marcus Camby’s contributions and has a WARP of 8.8.  This results in 28.93 expected wins.

Scenario 3: In Scenario 3, Blake Griffin plays as well as Camby did over the entire 2010 season and has a WARP of 12.7.  This results in 33.62 expected wins.

Scenario 4: Blake Griffin plays as well as Marcus Camby and Eric Gordon increases his WARP to 6, which is about average for a good 2-guard.  This results in 40.07 expected wins.

Scenario 5: Finally, on top of Scenario 4, the rest of the rookies play at a high level and produce a WARP of 3.  This results in 43.68 expected wins.

There are many potential scenarios, but these were ones that seemed reasonable enough to ponder on.

Although this projection may not be bulletproof, it’s an interesting way to look at the season’s potential.  This projection’s proximity to other projections is a good sign, and it allows us to see which positions the Clippers can improve at in terms of productivity and efficiency.  The addition of Ryan Gomes presents an improvement at small forward, as he will cannibalize minutes from Rasual Butler, who had one of the worse WARPs (-3.5) in the Western Conference.  Randy Foye provides improvement and stability at the backup guard positions in terms of WARP, and the great potential of the Clippers’ rookies will be fun to follow.

Ultimately, this and other statistical projections should not lessen your excitement for the season.  There are factors, such as player development, change in style of play, and chemistry, that are too difficult to capture into a neat number.  With the new additions to the roster and the coaching changes made, I know I, as a fan, can’t wait for tipoff.

Daniel Ikuta grew up in California where tennis was his first love … but the Clippers were second. He’s now based in Japan, where he’s teaching. Ikuta examines both the direct and ancillary effects replacing Marcus Camby’s presence with Blake Griffin might have on the 2010-11 season:

Before he was traded to the Portland Trailblazers midseason, Marcus Camby was arguably the Los Angeles Clippers’ best player.  He led the team in a variety of statistical measures, from box score mainstays like per-game rebounds and blocks, to more advanced calculations like PER and Defensive Rating.  Though it was unlikely that he’d be part of the team beyond the 2009-10 season, the notoriously brittle Camby played in 51 of a possible 52 games, keeping the Clippers near .500 and earning a contract extension with the Trailblazers.

Without Camby, the Clippers went 8-22, suffering their two largest losing streaks of the season.  Of course, there were other contributing factors to the team’s post all-star break tailspin, chief among them the firing of head coach Mike Dunleavy and the news that prized rookie Blake Griffin would require season-ending surgery.  However, those glancing into the Clippers’ 2010-11 crystal ball have to be wondering: how much will Marcus Camby’s absence affect the team?

Marcus Camby with the Clippers
Not surprisingly, advanced statistics see Marcus Camby as one of the more valuable members of the 2009-10 Clippers (“advanced statistics” here refers to any numbers one wouldn’t find in a box score).  As mentioned above, he led the team in Player Efficiency Rating (developed by John Hollinger, PER encompasses a player’s statistical contributions in one number) and Defensive Rating (an estimation of a player’s defensive ability, by Dean Oliver).  Camby managed to do so by leading the NBA in Rebound Percentage, or the amount of available rebounds that a player secures.  Meanwhile, he also led the team in Block Percentage, was second in Offensive Rating (also by Dean Oliver), and was third in Steal Percentage.

So, in order to replace Camby, the Clippers would need to find a rebounding machine who’s efficient on offense and can block shots and create turnovers on defense.

The Replacement
2009 No. 1 overall pick and still-rookie Blake Griffin should, if he stays healthy, play a similar number of minutes to the 31.3 per game that Camby averaged last year as a Clipper.  But talented as he is, compiling the numbers of Camby’s 2009-10 campaign may be a bit much to ask of a 21-year-old rookie coming off knee surgery.  Part of the problem is that Griffin is not nearly the same type of player Camby is.  Put another way, the Clippers didn’t draft Griffin to be Defensive Player of the Year down the road.  He will play a different role for the Clippers, meaning his contributions to the team will differ as well.

Defense
Marcus Camby prevented the opponent from scoring in many ways.  He blocked 4.6 percent of opponent field goal attempts and stole the ball on 2.2 percent of opponent possessions, good for 9^th and 20^th in the league, respectively.  When a shot went up, he gathered 32.9 percent of the available defensive rebounds, the best mark in the league.  Overall, the Clippers allowed 6.0 points less per 100 possessions when Camby was on the court.

Although at the college level Griffin managed respectable block and steal percentages of 3.6 and 1.9, respectively, he’ll be hard-pressed to duplicate those numbers in the NBA in his first year.  On the other hand, there’s a chance his gaudy 32.4 defensive rebound percentage holds up: recent collegians Kevin Love and DeJuan Blair saw their rates drop by only a couple of percentage points in their rookie seasons.

Trying to match the defensive output of a 14-year veteran and former DPOY as a rookie is certainly an uphill battle, unless your name is Tim Duncan.  But the responsibility can certainly be shared by other Clippers, most notably Chris Kaman.  As pointed out by Jon Nichols, there is a slight diminishing returns effect on blocks; that is, players occasionally “steal” blocks and/or block opportunities from teammates.  This effect can plainly be seen with Camby and Kaman: both players’ block rates dropped over 2 percent from 2007-08 to 2008-09.  Thus, one would expect Kaman’s block rate to rise again in 2010-11, somewhat mitigating Camby’s loss.

Offense
Despite a very good offensive rating, Camby’s miniscule Usage Percentage (the amount of team plays used by the player; five players on the court yield an average of 20) of 13.0 diminishes his value at the offensive end.  While Griffin won’t use 31.7 percent of possessions like he did in college, he’ll certainly contribute his fair share.  And that can only be good for players like Baron Davis and Chris Kaman, who respectively ranked 26^th and 27^th in usage percentage last year.  For perspective, both Steve Nash and Amare Stoudemire had lower usage percentages.  The hope, at least among Clipper fans, is that decreased usages for Davis and Kaman will help efficiency, as it has with Jason Kidd (to use a recent example).  It doesn’t hurt that the player taking possessions away averaged 25 points per 36 minutes on 65 percent shooting two years ago in college.

Conclusion
As expected, figuring out how much the Clippers will miss Camby invariably requires figuring out how good Blake Griffin will be.  Whereas the defense may suffer, the offense should benefit from the increased attention and usage Griffin provides.  Moreover, Griffin is hardly the only offseason addition; there are several new players, and a new coaching staff to boot.  Deciphering how the different pieces will fit into the new system is something perhaps not even advanced statistics can handle.

From his blog:

The Clippers are in turmoil and have announced they “want to win now.” Is this possible? Since trading away Marcus Camby the Clippers have played around 8 points worse than an average NBA team. Surprisingly, most of the poor play has occurred when Steve Blake is in. Blake had played great for Portland this year, but if you look at all minutes since the Camby trade the Clippers performance breaks down as follows:

• Blake or Novak in (mostly Blake) the Clippers in 342 minutes have played 14 points worse than average.
• Rest of time the Clippers have played 2 points better than average,

It may be that Blake is having trouble learning the offense, I do not know, but he has clearly been hurting the Clippers. Some other amazing stats:

• In the 94 minutes Outlaw and Baron are in together, the Clippers play 11 points better than average.
• Butler, Baron Davis, Gordon, Kaman and Gooden have been solid, playing 4 points better than average in 128 minutes.
• Butler, Davis, Gordon, Kaman and Smith have been great: In 53 min this lineup plays 18 points better than average.
• In 55 min with Outlaw and Gooden in and Kaman out the Clippers play 11 points better than average.

Building around the things that work should enable the Clippers to win some games. Perhaps then LeBron can be convinced that a nucleus of Kaman, Gordon, Outlaw, and Baron and a coach of his choosing is where he wants to land in 2010.

Winston fails to mention Blake Griffin, who should only add to the Clippers’ future.

ADDENDUM
Haralabos Voulgaris e-mails:
There is really nothing meaningful Adjusted numbers can determine from such small samples, his biggest minute sample is 128 minutes and you really can’t do anything to predict future success on a sample that small, in fact even using a whole season’s worth of your most-used lineup. For instance, in 2009 Boston’s most-used lineup played 4267 possessions (their starters). If you tried using one year of lineup data to predict future outcomes you would have faired much worse than using two full seasons’ worth of lineup data. I’d have a hard time stating with any level of authority any findings better than or worse than average using one full season of data, without a very sophisticated modeling technique. I can’t imagine using the clearest of crystal balls could draw any conclusions using 100 minutes of data.

I spent the weekend at the MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference in Boston. Last year, the same conference was held in a small academic building on the campus of MIT in Cambridge for 400 attendees. This year, the numbers exploded — one thousand individuals wore name tags, along with 400 people on a wait list. Those in Boston included NBA executives and prominent agents. Organizers moved the conference across the Charles River to the Boston Convention Center in order to accommodate the demand.

The substance of the conference was pretty much what you’d expect. Houston Rockets general manager Daryl Morey (the founder of the conference), Analytics godfather Dean Oliver (who works for the Nuggets), Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban, Portland Trail Blazers general manager Kevin Pritchard, Boston Celtics assistant general manager Mike Zarren and others who apply advanced statistical analytics to better their teams spoke on various panels about the value of this discipline in generating wins. Academics presented papers on everything from the value of a blocked shot to how best to maximize shot distribution among a team’s players.

All in all, 16 of the 30 NBA organizations were represented at the conference by executives or statisticians — that’s about double the number of teams who had paid attendees in 2009. It was heartening to run into smart young thinkers in this area who were free agents last year, but have been hired in the past 12 months by teams. Kevin Pelton, who has worked tirelessly in this field, just signed on with the Indiana Pacers. Ryan Parker, of Basketball Geek, has joined the Portland Trail Blazers. Jon Nichols, a brilliant grad student at Harvard in information technology, has been hired by an undisclosed team. For all the findings and discussions, the most profound takeaway from the conference was the overwhelming evidence that the application of advanced analytics is taking over the NBA. What was once a novelty has become a full-fledged movement. Not every team has embraced these tools, but as Dean Oliver pointed out, the smart ones have. Boston, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Houston, Memphis, Oklahoma City, Orlando, Portland, San Antonio have probably been the 10 most aggressive organizations. What do they have in common? Every one of these teams has a record of .500 or better this morning. If I’m a fan of a specific team, I want my team to be on that list and, unless my squad is winning titles on the strength of its personnel decisions (and checkbook), I’d be bothered if they weren’t.

Some teams executives will tell you that the League has gotten smart about furnishing teams with more extensive data (stats like deflections), and that the need to have experts on the payroll isn’t necessary. But there’s a vast difference between data and informed conclusions. The former are easy to come by; the latter requires great expertise. As Zarren said in the session on basketball analytics, “You can do two things: get more data, or use statistical techniques with the data that you have.” As we move forward in the empirical age, it strikes me that if you don’t have the proper personnel who can understand and utilize these techniques, your organization is going to be left behind.

The Clippers aren’t ignorant of advanced metrics. Mike Dunleavy made the wise decision to shift Rasual Butler into the starting lineup in part because basic plus-minus data were telling him that was the smart thing to do. Back in October, team executives said they targeted Craig Smith in the off-season because they loved his efficiency numbers. But these observations barely penetrate the surface of the shale. There is so much to be understood, a fact more and more teams are beginning to grasp.

Teams are very proprietary of what they’re learning and even whom they’re hiring to crunch these numbers. For all we know, the Clippers have an army of credentialed statisticians studying data, making unique discoveries about the team and passing along those findings to the decision makers in Playa Vista. If that’s not the case, Clippers fans should hope it soon becomes a reality. In an age where information is king, NBA teams, global corporations, governments and individuals can’t afford to be playing catch-up.

Wyn Douglas is the master of oblong modules featuring many of your favorite Clippers. His flow chart will give you an idea of how the current Clippers roster was built:

Top five units in basketball in overall rating (offensive points per 100 possessions-defensive points per 100 possessions, minimum 100 minutes played):

1. Dallas Mavericks (41.42)
Jason Kidd
Jason Terry
Shawn Marion
Dirk Nowitzki
Erick Dampier

2. Atlanta Hawks (36.66)
Mike Bibby
Jamal Crawford
Joe Johnson
Josh Smith
Al Horford

3. Los Angeles Lakers (24.22)
Derek Fisher
Kobe Bryant
Ron Artest
Pau Gasol
Andrew Bynum

4. Orlando Magic (20.28)
Jason Williams
Vince Carter
Mickael Pietrus
Rashard Lewis
Dwight Howard

5. Los Angeles Clippers (20.00)
Baron Davis
Eric Gordon
Rasual Butler
Marcus Camby
Chris Kaman

If you go with Adjusted +/- (account for both the teammates and the opponents on the floor), that Clippers unit jumps to #4 ahead of the Lakers unit.

The indispensable 82games.com has launched its 2009-10 coverage, and the advanced numbers for the Clippers are both fascinating and encouraging.

Improved Ball Movement
For the first time in a long while, the Clippers are truly able to space the floor effectively. As a result, the ball has been flowing freely from post to perimeter and from sideline to sideline.

As of Sunday, the Clippers rank second in the league in assist rate, and 65 percent of their field goals have been assisted. Last season, only 58 percent of the Clippers’ made shots were assisted. The Clips are “out-assisting” the opposition at every position except for small forward.

Eric Gordon, Dominant
When you examine Eric’s numbers closely, it begins to dawn on you: He rarely takes a bad shot.

If the pass hits him low or not in stride, he’ll survey the floor for the next best thing. If the defender is up in his face, Eric will gladly put the ball on the deck and drive. If the shot is contested, he’ll keep the ball moving — and he rarely takes an ill-advised heave off the dribble.

An eye-popping 88 percent of EJ’s jump shots are assisted, and his true shooting percentage mark is 63.5 percent.

How valuable has he been to the Clippers to start the season? The team scores 108.8 points per 100 possessions and allows only 100.9 when Eric is on the floor. When Eric’s on the bench, the Clippers are a basket case (94.0/125.4).

Baron Davis, More Restrained
As a jump shooter, Baron isn’t any better this season than he was last season (his eFG is actually a bit worse on jumpers). One thing has changed, though — jump shots represent fewer of Baron’s overall attempts, and it’s paying off.

In 2008-09, 70 percent of Baron’s attempts were jumpers, while only 30 percent were “close shots.” This season, that ratio is down to 59/41.

Think of Baron and his jumper/close shot distribution like the national Democratic Party and evangelical voters (or the Republican Party and Latino voters, if you prefer): “Close shots” don’t need to compose a majority of Baron’s attempts for him to be effective, but Baron needs to keep that gap narrow.

He’s being more selective, one of the reasons for his 52.8 percent true shooting percentage — well above his career average.

Baron’s conditioning can be seen in his shooting percentage on those inside shots. Last season, Baron converted only 48.6 percent of his close shots. This season, he’s finishing at a much better 58.1 percent clip. Baron is also rebounding the ball better and dishing out more dimes — two more reasons his PER is at an impressive 18.62.

Chris Kaman, Almost Too Good not to be an Outlier
I can’t stop looking at Kaman’s early stats. They’re irresistible.

Chris’ Estimated Wins Average (a stat that approximates how many wins a player is worth to his team) is second only to Dwight Howard among centers. His eFG on jump shots is 50 percent, his turnover rate has plummeted, and the Clippers are a markedly better defensive team when Chris is on the floor.

Aside from his offensive rebounding rate, it’s hard to find an area where Chris isn’t exceeding his career numbers — and the explanation for his drop in ORR is pretty logical: Guys who are killing you 17 feet from the basket as their team’s primary scoring option aren’t likely to scoop up a lot of misses off the front of the rim.

Is it fair to expect Chris to keep this pace up? Probably not. But even if Kaman’s true shooting percentage dips into the upper-50s from its current rate of 62.3 percent, the Clips will benefit from his efficiency, so long as the defense is there.

Lineups & Rotations
Though they’ve played lesser competition, the starting lineup of Davis-Gordon-Butler-Camby-Kaman is unstoppable. In the 99 minutes of basketball they’ve played as a unit, they’re a +39. In effective field goal percentage, the gap is .503 for the Fabulous Five and .405 for the opposition. This unit has also attempted 47 more free throws than the opponents during those 99 minutes. The only thing they don’t do well is rebound the ball.

When Thornton starts at the 3, the Clips are doing pretty well, too — a +13 in 76 minutes.

What does this tell you about the Clippers?

For one, Sebastian Telfair hasn’t been effective. In his 126 minutes on the floor, the Clips are a -30.

But wait a minute! Isn’t Bassy shooting the ball better than ever, with a true shooting percentage over 50 percent for the first time in his pro career? Well, yes. The Clippers are shooting the ball just as well when Telfair is at the point.

It’s Telfair’s defense that’s killing the Clippers’ reserve unit.

How bad is it? The Clippers give up a whopping 13 points more per 100 possessions when Telfair is on the floor (and more times than not, he’s guarding the ball). On top of that, the team takes a big rebounding hit with Telfair, turns the ball over more and gets to the line less frequently.

Cautious Optimism
Mike Dunleavy has been giving substantial minutes to eight players. Advanced stats show that four of them (Gordon, Kaman, Camby, Baron Davis) have been very efficient to stratospherically insane. Two of them have been quite useful, if limited (Smith, Butler). And, for whatever reason, the Clippers are likely to be outplayed when two of them (Thornton, Telfair) are on the floor.

What can we take away from all this? First and foremost, the health of the four principals is vital to the Clippers’ success. A prolonged absence by any one of them — particualrly the two starting guards — would devastate the team.

Beyond that, we’re seeing that a semi-controlled post-and-kick attack is where the Clippers are most effective. Break opportunities will surface as the Clippers tighten their defense (which we’ve witnessed over the past week) and as they improve on the glass (work in progress), but if they can continue to run the offense through the post and force opponents into making tough choices (double Kaman off Gordon? Yikes), there’s a blueprint here for success.

If you speak to executives who use advanced analytics to make player personnel decisions, many of them will tell you a similar story about such stats:

We like to look at the performance of specific units as much as individual players.

Since opening night, the Clippers have fielded five units that have played collectively greater than 9 minutes:

Notice something? The top four units — the lineups that have logged double-digit minutes — have each outperformed [ed: or played even with] the competition.  The starting lineup with Butler at the small forward has been particularly efficient offensively and has been beastly on the boards.

Collectively, both starting lineups have logged a +28 on the season!

So why have the Clippers dropped four of their first five games?

The more marginal lineups have killed them.

• The unit of Telfair-Gordon-Butler-Smith-Jordan have spent only six minutes on the floor together, but compiled a -8.
• Davis-Butler-Thornton-Camby-Kaman have played together for only four minutes, but went -7.
• Baron Davis-Ricky Davis-Butler-Thornton-Kaman? -6 in only four minutes.

What can we take away from all this?  For one, it’s early. The standard error on numbers like these 240 minutes into a season is enormous. But to the extent these stats tell us something, it might be that the Clips will operate best with a consistent rotation.