Technically speaking, the small forward position should be the easiest to fill in the NBA. The league is littered with athletes in the 6-foot-8 range – quick players with the skills to play on the wing and the size to help in the frontcourt. The skilled center comes rare, the true point guard capable of running a team perhaps even rarer. But wing players – they’re a dime a dozen.

But for years and years, the Clippers have struggled to fill the void at the small forward position. Physically, the guys they plugged in always passed the eye test. Ralph Lawler fawned over Corey Maggette’s frame on a nightly basis for a reason – he was the prototypical small forward in that he was strong enough to bang with the bigger 3’s and quick enough to go by the smaller ones.

For many teams, Maggette would have been a perfect fit. He was the type of efficient scorer offense -deprived teams covet. It’s why someone is always willing to trade for him, bloated contract or not.

But Maggette, quite famously, never fit into then head coach Mike Dunleavy’s scheme. Dunleavy wanted very specific pieces fulfilling very specific roles on the court, and Maggette’s strength (bull in china shop the hell out of defenses) never synced up with that. Maggette was a Bishop – slashing across the court, crashing into opponents, recklessly leading the attack off the wing with his diagonal assaults into enemy territory. Dunleavy seemed to want more of a Knight – a player capable of moving in multiple different directions, hiding behind the other big pieces and leaping out only when the time presented itself. He wanted someone defensive-minded, to protect guys from getting to the back line of the defense, and Maggette, as good as he was attacking, was never that.

Corey Maggette, destroying things.

And that probably explains the drafting of Al Thornton. He was athletic as could be, ACC-seasoned, and again, the perfect size. It was supposed to be round two at Maggette – a do-over. He was viewed as a player with similar offensive strengths without those nasty expectation of being the offensive bell-cow. Thornton was to be developed, honed, sculpted into what Maggette should have been, in the eyes of Dunleavy, anyway.

But after a promising rookie season, things began to regress. Thornton devolved, ironically, into a much less efficient version of Maggette – opting for perimeter shots instead of forays to the rim, playing defense only when directly challenged and wondering around on that end doing who knows what most of the time. But perhaps most damning for Thornton was his tendency to interpret every touch of the ball as an invitation from his teammates to shoot.

The Bishops.

Somewhere around this time, the Clippers decided their needs for a small forward had changed. The Bishops had not worked, the smaller Pawns masquerading as big pieces (still love you, Quinton Ross) hadn’t fit the bill either. What the Clippers needed was what every team wanted: a Queen. The grocery list had grown too long for any regular ol’ wing to fill. The player the Clippers needed now had to be capable of doing literally everything on the court.

Management did all they could to put themselves in position for that player last offseason. The most coveted piece on the board was out there, and they received a meeting with him. It didn’t work out (he went to Miami), and the Clippers found themselves back in the familiar position of having a hole at the small forward spot.

That hole would eventually be addressed by drafting Al-Farouq Aminu and signing Ryan Gomes. Both brought versatile skill-sets to the table, a refreshing change from the forwards of the past. Aminu, although incredibly raw, could play passing lanes, get out in transition, handle the ball a little bit, and block shots with his length. Gomes could shoot from mid-range, handle physical 3’s, slide over to the 4 and score some out of the post. Their attacks were varied. Pairing their versatility and size with Eric Gordon — a player that provides threes and drives to the rim almost exclusively on offense and avoids rebounds like the plague defensively – made a ton of sense.

Well, you saw how that worked out. By every statistical measure, the Clippers didn’t receive adequate production at the small forward position last year. The average NBA player has a Player Efficiency Rating of 15 – the Clippers small forwards combined for a rating of 10.8. Gomes produced personal career-lows in nearly every statistical category. Aminu, despite a strong start to the year that saw him hover around 45 percent from behind the arc, saw his shooting percentages fall off the cliff to the tune of 39 percent from the field and 32 percent from deep.

The gut reaction was to claim the following: Signing Gomes was a mistake, and drafting Aminu over Paul George or Gordon Hayward was an even bigger error.

But let’s pump the brakes on that for a minute, and think back on how the small forwards were utilized last year. Do you ever remember Ryan Gomes getting the ball with his back to the basket? That’s just one example. To further bludgeon the chess analogy to death, Vinny Del Negro wants and uses his small forwards more like Rooks than anything else – planting them deep in the corner for most possessions, where they were to hide out for most of the game.

Unfortunately, neither Gomes nor Aminu are pure, stand-still 3-point shooters – an underlying reason we saw Del Negro play a 3-guard lineup quite heavily towards the end of the year, using Randy Foye much in the same way he used Kirk Hinrich in Chicago. Gomes is obviously nowhere near the caliber of player that Deng is, but both look more comfortable pulling up off one dribble for a mid-range jumper than as spot-up guys.

About the only place we saw Gomes last year.

The developments of this past season bring back that familiar question to the upcoming speed-dating version of the NBA offseason – how do the Clippers get production from the small forward position?

The Clippers view Aminu as the answer — eventually. Presently, they’re less than committed to the idea of trotting him out as the starter. That’s not to say they don’t like Aminu, but they want the grown-up version of him right now – with a refined jumper and a basketball I.Q. – not the 20-year-old kid who looks lost out there more often than not.

Some of the other fine gentlemen on this blog have discussed the potential options for the Clippers, so I won’t repeat their work here. But I will say this – none of those players will matter without some serious changes.

Although the Clippers reoccurring theme of “small forward issues” trumps everything else, it should be noted that Del Negro had some problems with his small forwards in Chicago before he came to Los Angeles.
Although he only played roughly half the season, a young Luol Deng struggled mightily his first year in Del Negro’s offense. Per 36 minutes, Deng posted the worst point per game and rebounding numbers of his career alongside his second worst field goal percentage. In terms of PER rating, the small forward position was the worst on the Bulls team of the five positions. Deng’s production, like Gomes, was way down compared to where he was earlier in his career.

Good news though! The next season, Deng, although not a pure shooter by any means, adjusted and got back to his scoring ways. His points and rebounds per 36 minutes shot right back and beyond his career averages, he got to the line more and he basically found ways to be effective offensively despite not getting many sets ran specifically for him. When the ball found him in the corner, he attacked off it. The team numbers reflected it – in 09-10, the small forward position for the Bulls had the second most shot attempts of the five positions and posted the third best PER rating. Del Negro’s utilization of his 3’s – and synergy with his player– seemingly improved.

Luol Deng's bounceback -- a reason for hope.

With that said, it’s a reality that small forwards will never be huge offensive factors in Del Negro’s pick-and-roll heavy scheme. With Eric Gordon and Blake Griffin on board, that’s not necessarily the worst thing. You want the majority of the possessions going their way. Mo Williams will do a lot of standing and shooting (and hopefully more of this), DeAndre Jordan will be a large human near the rim, and whoever occupies the three spot will likely balance between those two options while Gordon and Griffin demand all the action on their side of the court.

That doesn’t mean the Clippers current forwards are doomed for eternal failure. Gomes publicly pledged to get more shots up than ever before this offseason, and poor Aminu’s arms will probably fall off with how many threes the staff will make him shoot in practice.

The question though, after all these years, still remains. How do the Clippers get production out of their small forward spot?

Do the pieces need to change? Or do the roles the current pieces occupy need to change?

Like it usually does, the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle.

If tonight’s game felt familiar to you, there’s a reason for that. You’ve played in this game before.

Let me explain. From the arc of the game right down to some of the characters in it, tonight’s matchup felt a lot like a glorified pickup game.

Take Corey Maggette for example. Ever play with someone that calls every single foul? Even if he’s the one that charges in to you at full speed? Well, that’s Maggette. He does his bull in the china shop routine and completely ignores teammates once he puts the ball on the deck. Everyone hates playing with the guy who calls every foul, and I have a hard time seeing anyone getting any joy out of playing basketball with Corey Maggette. To wit, Maggette went into full blown black hole mode en route to a three-for-16 performance from the field tonight.

Baron Davis is that guy who has the most talent on the floor, but there’s always something missing. Whether it’s his jumper or his defense, there’s always something that you can point to with him and say “that’s the reason why he’s not elite.” Tonight, Baron plays as close to a perfect half of basketball as possible, going seven-for-10 from the field for 19 points, five rebounds, five assists and zero turnovers. But then Baron injures his wrist late in the first half, and he eventually has to leave the game because of it. It’s a shame. Even when Baron does everything right, something eventually goes wrong.

With Eric Gordon, Drew Gooden, Travis Outlaw, Craig Smith, and Baron Davis all out of action, the pressure fell squarely on the shoulders of Chris Kaman (or, the one guy taller than everyone else) to lead his team offensively. Kaman responded well against the Warriors small front line, scoring easily throughout the game on the inside and totaling 27 points on the evening.

Steve Blake plays the role of gym rat tonight, logging an outrageous 46 minutes due to the Clips being shorthanded at guard. It’s always fascinating to watch players like Blake in the midst of chaos. Blake’s that guy that passes, cuts, screens away from the ball and all that other nonsense. It looks out of place at the park, and it looks out of place at Staples tonight.

There are a couple of funny moments in the fourth quarter of this one. Devean George brushes off the cobwebs to hit a few shots, and both times he runs down court screaming and pumping his fists. It’s hard to tell if he’s being sarcastic — I have no idea how serious of a person Devean George is, but it’s hard not to picture George as the ridiculous old dude down at the park who once a month turns back the clock and hits a few shots and simply has to let everyone know about it.  Between George’s theatrics and the slightly insane enthusiasm of Ronny Turiaf, the Warriors at least provide entertainment value down the stretch.

The Clippers win this one behind the late game scoring of Rasual Butler (or, that guy who tries to do way too much) and DeAndre Jordan (that one kid that can dunk). After three straight buckets right at the rim by Jordan, Butler knocks down a mid-range jumper and then a big three to pull the Clippers within one at the 6:22 mark of the fourth quarter.

From there, the game plays out like both teams are locked up at game point. Suddenly, the defense ratchets up about 40 notches, and the previous Laissez-faire approach to defense goes out the window. Mike Smith actually mentions at the three minute mark that the “next bucket wins.” He’s referring to Lawler’s Law of course, but you could have fooled me.

The play of the game comes in the clutch at the [2:02, 4thQ] mark. Chris Kaman gets the ball on the left block, and DeAndre Jordan ambles over to the left wing to act as a kickout for Kaman should he get in trouble. Aside from the hilarity of DeAndre Jordan acting as a spot up shooter with Kaman having the ball in the post, the play works wonderfully. After looking confused for a bit, Jordan gives a quick basket cut and Kaman delivers a beautiful pass (!) to Jordan for the easy dunk. The Clips lead goes to five, and they hang on the rest of the way.

April basketball for the Warriors and Clippers isn’t much different from the pickup game for us regular scrubs. The more experienced players on both sides won’t remember this game for any reason, as it will just blend into the thousands of other games they’ve played. Neither team cares much about the result really, as wins and losses don’t really matter at this point.

But then there’s the kid who can dunk. He isn’t experienced yet, so these wins mean something. It’s confidence. It’s matching the second highest total for rebounds in your career (15). It’s a game deciding bucket. Maybe to the bitter veteran those things don’t mean anything, but you don’t survive as a young player in the NBA if you don’t enjoy the small victories when they come your way.

This is an exciting time for those trying to find new and compelling ways to understand basketball through analytical means.  The sphere of advanced statistical analytics is experiencing a golden era, and I was fortunate enough to be at ground zero this past weekend — the MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference.  Some of the smartest people in the NBA world gathered in Cambridge to exchange ideas and pose larger questions about what we can — and in some cases, can’t — learn about the pro game from advanced data.

One of the things that continues to challenge people who work with this information is how to integrate individual data into a team game.  If you’re a fan who grew up on Bill James Baseball Abstracts, then you have a fair understanding that baseball, at its essence, is an individual sport masquerading as a team sport, which makes it much easier to illuminate many of these questions.  You can rationally measure how many runs a lineup with nine Dustin Pedroias would generate in 162 games vs. a lineup of nine Hanley Ramirezes, but basketball is a much tougher proposition.  You could, theoretically, compare the offensive and defensive efficiency ratings of a team composed of five Chris Pauls vs. a team of five Yao Mings — and we have smart guys like Kevin Pelton on the case — but it wouldn’t produce results that are terribly useful in comparing the two players’ relative values.  That’s because a direct statistical contrast between two individuals is a much trickier exercise in basketball.

Aside from determining how certain players are undervalued, what are some of the practical utilities for all this cool new data?  One answer I heard repeatedly from the panelists and in conversations is applying this information to measure the performance of 5-man units.  A couple of different stat guys told me that, for one, information about 5-man units can be imparted to coaches in a palatable way.  An ornery coach might not want to hear from some data-cruncher that he needs to run fewer isolations sets for Player A out on the wing, but that same coach will likely be much more receptive to a few simple numbers that show he’s got a 5-man unit that’s killing the competition.

The Clippers are a tough nut to crack on a lot of this stuff because they haven’t been able to run consistent lineups out on the floor.  The Clips have exactly one 5-man unit that’s shared the floor for more than 116 minutes this season: Baron-Gordon-Thornton-Randolph-Camby.  That unit is a shade below average, with an adjusted +/- of -0.15, and an overall rating per 100 possessions of -2.17, which is a bit crummier.

Among the Clippers’ 5-man units that have played together for a measurable number of minutes, the best is Baron-Gordon-Collins-Randolph-Camby.  In 84 possessions [about 46 minutes of basketball], this unit has outscored its opponents 98-72. Keep in mind that the standard error in such a small sample is pretty massive (Aaron Barzilai will tell you as much), and the majority of these data come from two games — the recent win over Boston and the December 12 Portland game.   That being the case, these results support the notion that if you swap out Al Thornton for Mardy Collins on the wing, you get a substantially more efficient performance.

Naturally, the Clippers can’t capitalize on this information right now even if they wanted to, because Marcus Camby is suffering from head fluid, which sounds really unpleasant.  But in thinking about how the Clippers might want to deal with LeBron James tonight, it’s hard to imagine throwing Al Thornton out there to guard him.  I’m no fan of Mardy Collins’ inefficient offensive game. He displays a horrible habit of  amplifying those inefficiencies by attempting far too many shots, a condition his coach needs to manage more vigilantly.  That aside, the data show that on both an individual and team basis, Collins is considerably more useful than Al Thornton, who is the team’s least efficient regular, when placed alongside the Clippers’ other three primary scorers — Randolph, Gordon, and Baron Davis.

In some respects, this conversation evokes the debates of 2005-2006, when Corey Maggette and Quinton Ross were competing for playing time at the small forward position.  Maggette was by every metric the more prolific offensive player, but there was enough data to suggest that the team played a more efficient game defensively when Ross was the SF alongside Cassell-Mobley-Brand-Kaman.  The truth was that both Ross and Maggette had glaring deficiencies, but the ensuing discussion was one of the more interesting of its day for Clippers fans, with reasonable arguments on both sides.

Obviously, Thornton’s starting role hasn’t really been challenged by Collins, but in thinking about LeBron tonight…shouldn’t it be?  If you had told me on Christmas Day that the matter of Collins v. Thornton would ever be a topic of earnest consideration, I would’ve eaten my hat, but among the dastardly number of issues that the Clippers are dealing with, the Al Thornton question stands out prominently.  While I don’t support Al’s public humiliation by a tactless owner going off half-cocked, his role on the team needs to be examined more closely, particularly on a night when his team requires someone at the 3 who has some degree of defensive intuition. Again, Mardy Collins is not the long-term solution for the Clippers at the 3 — far from it — but most nights, he’s the better of two undesirable options.

Corey travels six times in a single play [hat tip: Henry]:

Building on the Chris Mannix report that “the Warriors are already regretting signing Maggette to a five-year, $50 million deal last offseason,” Art Thompson III shares some impressions from his years covering the Clips:

Clippers center Chris Kaman said the half-court offense often would get stagnant because Maggette would simply try to barge through defenders to get to the rim…

My sources told me that fomer [sic] Clipper forward Elton Brand was so determined not to have a personal friendship ruined with Maggette (the two have been close since they attended Duke together), that Brand did not want to play another year with Maggette, having decided that seven years with the Clippers was enough.

Regarding the Warriors’ reported regret over bringing Corey in, McFruity on Hoops gets it right:  Corey Maggette is precisely the same player today that he was in Los Angeles — an efficient, albeit single-dimensional, scorer.  The notion that anyone should be surprised, alarmed, outraged, or disappointed that Corey Maggette won’t hit a cutter, pass out on a drive, or generally do anything in the halfcourt that makes his teammates better, is absurd.

I harbor no real regrets that the Clippers and Corey Maggette parted ways, but for better or worse, there’s no other player in the Association whose development as a pro we’ve watched more closely over the past decade.  Corey’s game is flawed – and those shortcomings have been documented extensively here and elsewhere – but he’s still an interesting player from an observational standpoint. I’ve always been ambivalent about Corey.  His game has this comforting efficiency that I really admire,  but in the end, I guess I instinctively prefer players who are a little more cerebral.  That’s probably unfair.  And even though I think the Clippers are better longterm without him, I’d be lying if I said I didn’t miss him a little.

Since we’re playing the Warriors tomorrow afternoon, I thought it might be interesting to see how Corey is fitting in up in Oakland.  Has Don Nelson asked him to adjust his settings?  How has the system up there influenced his game?  Just a little curious, that’s all.

It’s important to note that Corey has been suffering from a bad hammie.  Last night is his first game since November 3, and he plays only 28 minutes.   Because Don Nelson recruits his roster from a carnival job fair, Corey is assigned to guard Rasheed Wallace at the outset, even though he gives up five inches to the Detroit big man:

• [1st, 11:42]  The Pistons don’t waste any time exploiting the Sheed-Corey mismatch.  Wallace gets good position just off the left block.   He backs Corey in, spins baseline and elevates an easy jumper over Corey.
• [1st, 11:07]  Corey tries valiantly to get between Wallace and the ball, but ends up fouling Wallace.  No shots.
• [1st, 10:05]  The Warriors push the ball up after a Detroit bucket.  CJ Watson gets it ahead to Corey in the open court.  As Corey races upcourt, Wallace gambles unsuccessfully, and now Corey barrels straight to the basket — but he loses the handle as he crosses into the paint.  Turnover.
• [1st, 9:07]  Corey is doing yeoman’s work on Wallace.  It isn’t easy.  But he’s doing a good enough job to force Rip Hamilton to overthrow the entry pass into Wallace.  Andris Biedrins steals the ball.  Give Corey a defensive assist.
• [1st, 8:40] On a Hamilton/Wallace S/R, Corey does a very nice job showing off the screen.  It forces Hamilton to step back and fire an off-balanced jumper.

On most of Golden State’s halfcourt possessions, you’ll find Corey Maggette in a very familar spot — loitering along the arc out on the wing.   With no real post threat other than Biedrins, there’s a lot to space to work with, but Corey — as he often did in Los Angeles — doesn’t do much to fill it.

• [1st, 8:02]  In a slow-it-down halfcourt set, Corey gets the ball up high against Rasheed Wallace.  He holds the ball.  Iverson is cheating over just a little and has his eye on Corey, knowing that Corey prefers to go right.   That’s exactly what Corey does.  Iverson sticks his hand in for a strip.  Wallace isn’t as quick as Corey, but does an effective job at funneling Corey toward the help — Tayshaun Prince.  Prince challenges Corey at the rim, forcing him to throw up a wild layup attempt that isn’t close.

That’s where Detroit is so effective defensively.  In recent years, they’ve never been that quick of a team; it’s just that they know exactly how to manipulate the action so that the help always arrives where and when it should.  The Spurs also do this well.

• [1st, 6:40]  Wallace wants the ball again against Corey.  He gets it.  Corey bodies up nicely. Wallace spins baseline, gets the look he wants — he towers over Corey — but Biedrins is there to help, and Wallace misses the shot.   The Pistons retain possession, and on the reset, Iverson gets Corey on a defensive switch.  Corey has been an adequate on-ball defender most of his career.  Here, he manages to stay in front of Iverson, who takes a 15-foot jumper that’s a little bit long.
• [1st, 5:37]  Detroit’s rotation falls apart, and Corey is left with a wide, wide open 3PA up top, but misses the shot.
• [1st, 5:16]  A baseline drive by Iverson scrambles the Golden State defense.  Wallace has drifted high, where he sets up at the top of the arc.  Corey is distracted by all the action in the left corner, where Hamilton has the ball.  Rip sees this and fires a pass to Wallace.  Corey is too late and Wallace drains the 3PA.
• [1st, 4:36]  The Prince/Wallace S/R on the left side leaves Maggette on Prince off the switch.  Stephen Jackson picks up Wallace, whose 13-footer is no good.  This is probably the smarter defensive matchup for GSW, and I’m not sure why Nelson chooses otherwise.
• [1st, 3:24]  Corey gets the ball on the right side against Wallace in an iso set.  He puts his head down, and drives right along the baseline.  Tayshaun Prince had been covering Jackson at the top of the circle.  When Corey begins his drive, Prince slides down.  This leaves Jackson free to dive through the lane toward the hoop.  Corey makes a pretty pass around Wallace that finds Jackson at the basket for the slam.   Beautiful look from Corey.  How many times in Los Angeles did he hit a cutter off his drive?  Nice work.

In general, Corey plays Wallace much tighter away from the basket as the quarter progresses.  Wallace never sees another shot in the period.  When Corey returns with about 3:00 in the 2nd quarter, he mistakenly doubles Hamilton at 20 feet off a screen, leaving Wallace alone for a 21-footer that falls.  Corey gets his first FTAs of the night at [2nd, 0:42] when Detroit gets crossed up on their S/R defense, allowing Corey a path through the lane.   Amir Johnson steps in, and Corey throws his body into Johnson’s, earning a trip to the line.

The second half will look a lot more familiar to Clipper fans.  Of Golden State’s first nine possessions of the second half, Corey gets FTAs on five of them, and another transition possession yields a Corey 15-foot jumper.  Here are the possessions that yield Corey’s five trips to the stripe:

• [3rd, 11:46]  You know it well — Corey curls from the left corner, receives the ball from Watson, and slashes through the lane, drawing contact from Kwame Brown.   He sinks both FTAs.
• [3rd, 9:29] Corey likes his matchup: It’s Walter Herrmann, and you can see Corey licking his chops as he holds the ball on the left wing.  He takes a hard dribble with his left, gets a good first step on Herrmann, who doesn’t stand a chance.  As Herrmann hacks Corey 12 feet out, Corey hurls the ball toward the hoop, earning two FTAs.  He hits both and GSW, who led by seven at the half, extends its lead to 12.
• [3rd, 7:58] Classic transition Corey:  He skies for the rebound at the defensive end, weaves his way upcourt, finds the most vulnerable defender — Herrmann again — barrels into him, heaves the ball at the basket, and earns two more FTAs.  He sinks both.
• [3rd, 7:35]  The Warriors might be reckless, but they aren’t stupid.  The ball goes back into Corey against Herrmann just off the right elbow.  Corey backs him in, then kicks the ball back out to Watson, who promptly returns it to Corey a few feet deeper.  Herrmann hacks him.  It’s the 4th team foul at 7:31, and Herrmann’s 3rd personal.  Michael Curry has seen enough, and yanks Herrmann.   Off the inbound, it goes back to Corey on the right side, this time against Rip Hamilton.   Corey backs him in, spins baseline, and draws the shooting foul against Hamilton.  Corey sinks 1 of 2.
• [3rd, 6:56] Right back to Maggette, who has been the focal point of the offense.  This time he’s up against Arron Afflalo.  Corey backs him in, turns, draws contact, and sinks one of two from the line.

Afflalo gets his revenge on Corey about a minute later, when Corey fails to box him out off a Detroit miss.  Afflalo collects the OR, steps back and nails a 3PM.  For whatever reason, the Warriors go away from the Maggette toward the end of the period, though it’s not like Detroit makes a profound adjustment or anything.  Corey carelessly coughs up the ball at [3rd, 2:53], which lets Afflalo loose on a fast break for an easy two and the foul.

Corey enters the game at [4th, 5:50] with his team leading by one.   He takes two shots down the stretch, missing both:

• [4th, 2:47]  Corey brings the ball up and holds it, as all four of his Warrior teammates clear the right side for him.  Corey is being covered by Tayshaun Prince.  Corey lowers his head and takes a hard dribble with his right.  Prince stands his ground, forcing Corey against the baseline.  Corey spins back left, elevates for an awkward running 5-footer, hoping to draw contact.   In Corey’s defense, he doesn’t have a lot of options.  Azebuke is immediately picked up by Hamilton as he dives for the basket.
• [4th, 1:55]  The Warriors are down by three.  The ball goes into Corey at the same spot on the right wing against Prince.  Again, the Warriors clear out, and again Corey drives right, and again Prince holds his ground.  Corey elevates — this time about 10 feet out — launches an awkward jumper on the way down that misses badly.    A better decision: Drive left, draw Jackson’s man [Afflalo] low, and hit Jackson on the perimeter for an open shot.

Corey finishes with 13 points in 28 minutes on 2-7 FG, 9-12 FT.  His function in the Warriors’ offense is remarkably similar to his role in Los Angeles.  Because Nelson likes to run, Corey will get a few more transition opportunities than he did as a Clipper.  And because Nelson likes to field a small lineup, Corey will often be saddled with the added responsibility of having to defend post sets against guys much taller than him.

Tomorrow should be interesting.